Start Dating site axe murderer guam

Dating site axe murderer guam

So too, apparently, is the government, which has not thought to invoke the Culebra St. It is quite another to say that the term “United States” in a drug interdiction statute invokes the twelve-mile interdiction boundary rather than the three-mile plenary one.

Consider the following example: Under the government's interpretation of § 952(a), a passenger who carries a bag of marijuana on a flight from Portland to Anchorage has committed the crime of importation, while a drug-carrying traveler who departs from the same terminal at the Portland airport is guilty only of mere possession (or perhaps possession with intent to distribute) if his flight lands in Phoenix rather than Anchorage. Congress may well have been concerned that courts would read a foreign origin requirement into the statute and responded by adding the words “any place.” The majority hands Congress a catch-22: If it uses simple language, judges will find hidden within it all sorts of implicit limitations, but if it adds language to underscore that a statute should be given a broad, literal compass, judges will point to the redundancy as a justification for a narrower reading-because, after all, the literal meaning would have been implicit in the unadorned text. It borrows its argument from Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1137-39, which thought that the government's interpretation of the second clause of section 952(a) (“into the United States from any place outside thereof”) would render the first clause (“into the customs territory of the United States from any place outside thereof (but within the United States)”) superfluous. When it claimed that “[a]ny place that is just outside the customs territory of the United States is international waters,” id., it was wrong. It is within easy reach of drug manufacturing sources in Central and South America, and an ideal launching pad for smuggling into Puerto Rico, which is only a few minutes away by plane and, at most, a couple of hours by boat. Ed.2d 251 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In any case, the customs and noncustoms territories are contiguous, as they were in 1970 when Congress enacted the statute.

But what, exactly, is the additional evil committed by the Alaska-bound traveler? This judicial three card monte is useful in letting us reach whatever result we please, but I suspect Congress would prefer we take it at its word.3. It explained: The government's broad reading of clause 2 ․ brings any conduct conceivably addressed under clause 1 within the coverage of clause 2. When it claimed that an individual entering the customs territory “would always be directly shipping from international waters,” id., it was wrong. Ignoring this border because it's the “lone point of contiguity,” Maj. at 629, is like telling the little Dutch boy he can go home because the dike only has one leak. The text of the statute and the indisputable facts of American geography are proof enough that Congress knew what it was doing. This inescapable geographical fact undercuts not only the majority's only plausible argument, but also Ramirez-Ferrer's value as precedent.

The Cabaccangs eventually expanded their operation to include large-scale shipments of methamphetamine to Guam for local distribution. That the flight carrying the contraband departed from a domestic location is irrelevant, the government maintains, because § 952(a) is unconcerned with the origin of a shipment of drugs that enters the United States from international airspace.